Work

Origins and Implications of the European Union's Enlargements Negotiations Procedures

Year: 2002
Type: report
Abstract: This paper analyzes the history of the procedure for negotiating accession to the European Community/Union (EC/EU), with particular focus on the British and Spanish cases, because they shed light into the current negotiations with Central and Eastern Europe and reveal the main implications for the functioning and legitimacy of the future enlarged Union.The rules governing enlargement negotiations were first put in place to deal with Britain's "conditional" application for membership in 1961, and as a result, the negotiating procedures were overtly defensive of the still emerging and fragile EC rules and of the cohesion among the member states.In spite of a new "unconditional" British application in 1967, the Community tightened up the rules for negotiating enlargement between 1969 and 1972.The success of such procedure in safeguarding the member states' interests and preserving the Community's upper hand during accession negotiations meant that they were used again between 1977 and 1985 to deal with Spain which, being overwhelmingly pro-European, constituted the opposite type of candidate.Thus the paper argues that procedure has remained almost unchanged (if not tighter) over successive waves of enlargement and has become the "Community method" of negotiating it, regardless of the nature and approach of the candidates.With very few (and not really substantive) alterations, it is now being followed to negotiate with the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.The paper shows that, despite its usefulness in protecting the member states' interests and Community rules, the procedure has had important drawbacks.First, the "bilateral" format, which ensured that "member states came first" and controlled the agenda, had the downside of "under-representing" future members, thus storing up trouble for after accession, when they sought to redress the "imbalances" they had accepted while in a weaker position.Second, it had the effect of shaping the negotiations as a mirror-image of the Community's decision-making structures themselves, in particular, the Community's weak inter-sectoral co-ordination mechanisms.This allowed the "difficult" chapters (i.e.redistributive issues like agriculture and the budget) to be insulated and left until the end-game when, under pressure to conclude negotiations, candidates were pushed to accept "tough" EC proposals.Third, the "bilateral" procedure also made Community negotiating positions inflexible and often left the candidates in a "take it or leave it" situation.Finally, the decision in 1961 that enlargement negotiations should not preclude the development of the Community turned the acquis communautaire into a "moving target", as the EC proceeded to modify those parts of the acquis that it did not want to see extended to the new members.This was the main cause of delay and misapprehension during Britain's and Spain's accessions and could yet cause problems in the negotiations with Central and Eastern European countries today.
Author: Lorena Ruano
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2139154579
Cites: 25
Cited by: 11
Related to: 10