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The Hazards of Agency

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Year: 2009
Type: preprint
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1417412
Author: Barry M. Mitnick
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Language: English

Topic: Economic Theory and Institutions
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: agency theory, moral hazard, adverse selection, hidden information, hidden action, principal-agent relationship, control hazards, reputation, legitimacy, observability, corporate governance, corporate political activity, collective bargaining, employment relations, corruption, bureaucratic behavior, government regulation, interest groups
SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W286426232
Cites:
Cited by: 9
Related to: 10
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