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The Four-Model Theory of Consciousness: A Simulation-Based Framework Unifying the Hard Problem, Binding, and Altered States

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Consciousness, on the Four-Model Theory, is constituted by ongoing self-simulation: a system builds a model of itself, relates to that model, and interacts with it. Models divide along two axes — scope (world vs. self) and mode (implicit vs. explicit) — yielding four model kinds rather than four modules. The implicit models are substrate-level, innate or learned, and non-conscious; the explicit models are virtual and transient, and are phenomenal when they enter the self-model's closed loop. Qualia are constitutive properties of the computational level, incoherent at the substrate level as a spreadsheet cell's value is incoherent at the transistor level, which reframes the Hard Problem as resting on a category error: phenomenal properties are sought at a level where they do not exist. The framework rests on three principles. Open-ended computation allows free modeling, and near-criticality is the signature that property leaves in the human brain rather than the requirement itself. Recurrent non-linear dynamics of sufficient complexity host a second computational level: persistent activity patterns individuated by their mutual effects rather than by the cells that carry them. Phenomenology is a real, physical effect on that level, arising where the modeling closes on itself — where the self-model and the world-model each enter the other's update rule. That this closure constitutes phenomenality is not provable with current science. The four kinds are then a minimum the architecture forces rather than a posit: four is the floor, not the ceiling. Redirection of the modeling resource, variable permeability and forking of the self-model follow as consequences, and through them the theory accounts for psychedelic phenomenology, anesthetic mechanisms, dream and lucid-dream states, split-brain phenomena, dissociative identity disorder and animal consciousness. Several claims derived from the theory's 2015 axioms have since received converging independent support (Xu et al., 2024; Hengen & Shew, 2025; Algom & Shriki, 2026), though that convergence concerns the near-critical signature the computational requirement predicts, not the requirement itself, and is shared with other criticality-based frameworks. Novel predictions — among them that psychedelics should alleviate anosognosia — remain largely untested. MoC7 (Copenhagen, 2026) poster, SJÄLV booklet and conference material: research.matthiasgruber.com/moc7/ Changelog v34 **v34 (2026-11-09)** Supersedes v33 (2026-11-08). *Deep sleep (Sections 5.1, 5.3, 6.3; Table 4).* That a sleeper can be woken means that external input can instantiate the explicit models, not that they are running. In deep NREM sleep they may be absent, as under deep anesthesia; instantiated too weakly to close; closed without the write-back that would leave a memory; or running weakly, leaving a trace too indistinct to report. Awakening reports cannot separate the first three. The deep-NREM row of Table 4 now reads "from absent to weak" where it read "probably absent", and in deep sleep the simulation now weakens or stops. In the DREAM database, 178 of 300 classified N3 awakenings were followed by a report of experience (Wong et al., 2025). A preregistered reanalysis of five DREAM datasets found that reports of experience without content do not give way steeply to reports of no experience as slow-wave activity rises within a person (Gruber, 2026g). Where slow waves were boosted by closed-loop sound, reports moved toward experience without content (Juan et al., 2023). *The closure identity (Abstract; Sections 3, 3.4, 3.4.3).* That closure constitutes phenomenality is now stated as not provable with current science; v33 said it was argued for and not derived. Section 3.4.3 adds why the subject has no shortcut: on the notion of holding in Gruber (2026h), the holding in progress lies outside what is held, so what a system holds of its own experience is the content in the loop and finished models of the updating. The proof runs for the subject as for an observer, by fit and by refutation. *The substrate and the simulation (Sections 3.3, 3.4.6, 4.2.5).* The infinite-regress argument for the substrate's exclusion is replaced: the generating in progress lies outside what the simulation holds, and the substrate enters the simulation only as a model of itself (Gruber, 2026h). The substrate description now "fixes" the phenomenal facts; v33 said "entails". *Free will (Section 4.2.2).* The working of the apparatus that produces a decision lies outside what the simulation holds, however well the simulation models the apparatus itself (Gruber, 2026h). *Capacity and process (Section 3.1).* The example of capacity without the process is now a person under deep anesthesia. *Criticality (Sections 1.3, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.7, 3.7.3, 8.5).* Near-criticality is the signature of free modeling in the human brain; v33 said "in neural tissue". *Embodiment (Section 3.7.3).* Embodiment is required for consciousness to emerge naturally, not for it to continue existing. *References added:* Gruber (2026g, 2026h), Juan et al. (2023), Wong et al. (2025).
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7129201006
FWCI: 68.21
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Cited by: 9
Related to: 10