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Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard

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Year: 2015
Type: article
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.003
Authors: Hector Chade, Natalia Kovrijnykh
Institution: Arizona State University
Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: moral hazard, principal-agent problem, option evaluation, signal informativeness, optimal contracts, dynamic contracting, prior probability, effort incentives, optimal stopping, commitment

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2201216956
FWCI: 1.667
Cites: 29
Cited by: 38
Related to: 10
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